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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF rTAH, 
Res~ndent, 
-vs.- Case. No. 7808 
VIRGIL THOMAS, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Virgil Thmnas, defendant and appellant herein, was 
convicted of the crime of burglary in the third degree 
arising out of the burglary of a car belonging to one 
Edward Underwood, whereby certain tools contained in 
the glove compartment of the car were stolen. The bur-
glary occurred on August 15, 1950, someti1ne between the 
hours of 7 :00 o'clock A.M., and 12 :00 o'clock noon. The 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
crime was not reported until August 16, 1950. At ap-
proximately 12:00 o'clock noon on the 15th of August, 
1950, Officer Wilson A. Allen, of the Ogden City Police, 
received a call to proceed to the National Tavern, 25th 
Street, Ogden City, to check "Slick" Thomas, "he was 
trying to sell some tools." (Tr. 21) Defendant was ar-
rested with the too~s in his possession, later identified 
as those stolen. The evidence shows defendant made ex-
planations of his possession of the stolen tools at the time 
of his arrest and again ~t the trial, and that they were 
not consistent. (Tr. 22, 33, 34) A trial was had before 
a jury, defendant was convicted and he appeals. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
DIRECT A VERDICT OF NOT GUILTY. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
DIRECT A VERDICT OF NOT GUILTY. 
It is proper for the trial court to refuse to direct a 
verdict when the determination of guilt depends upon 
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the credibility of witnesses or the evidence is sufficient 
to overcome the presun1ption of innocence. The trial court 
is not justified in directing a verdict when disputed facts 
would support n1ore than one conclusion, or where, admit-
ting all the facts for the purposes of the motion and giv-
ing then1 a reasonable construction in favor of the party 
against whom the motion is directed, it appears that the 
evidence is not such that reasonable men would not differ. 
Where the case is a close one on the evidence a directed 
verdict should be refused. A directed verdict should not 
be given upon a mere preponderance of the evidence. 
53 Am. J ur., Trial, § 362, 363, 365 ; 17 ALR 917, 918, 930. 
At page 10 of Appellant's brief it is admitted the 
State did prove a burglary had been committed and that 
property was thereby stolen. The corpus delecti was 
therefore established. State v. Kinghorn, 109 Mont. 22, 
93 P. 2d 964, 968. The stolen property was identified 
by uncontroverted testimony (Tr. 11, 12, 19), as the same 
found in possession of defendant at the time of his arrest. 
(Tr. 22, 23) 
Defendant attempted to explain his possession of the 
burglarized property on two occasions. (Tr. 22, 33, 34) 
These explanations were contradictory. If defendant's 
explanation is to serve him to advantage it is necessary 
that it be satisfactory. This court, in the case of State v. 
Brooks, 101 Utah 584, 126 P2d 1044, 1046, sets forth 
the tests an explanation of stolen property has to meet 
before it will be considered satisfactory. 
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"* * * Webster defines satisfactory as: Re-
leaving the mind from doubt or uncertainty; yield-
ing content; adequate for the purpose; serving 
to allay the demands of a challenger or ques-
tioner. See, also, Shriver v. Union Stock Yards 
National Bank, 117 Kan. 638, 232 P. 1062, 1066. 
It is a sta;tement which enables the mind to rest 
thereon with confidence. Pittman v. Pittman, 72 
Ill. App. 500; State v. rrrosper, supra. It is satis-
factory when of such a nature that a court or 
jury, as men of ordinary intelligence, discretion, 
and caution, may repose confidence in it. Jack-
man v. Lawrence Drilling & Development Co., 106 
Kan. 59, 187 P. 258. It does not mean beyond 
a reasonable doubt, but it should not be ambigu-
ous, equivocal, or contradictory; it should be per-
spicuous, and cause the mind to repose confidence f 
in it. American Freehold Land Mtg. v. Pace, 23 
Tex. Civ. App. 222, 56 S.W. 377; sufficient for a 
reasonable person acting in good faith, Secklir 
v. Penny, 148 Misc. 807, 266 N.Y.S. 327. Adequate 
and sufficient to convince a reasonable person; 
sufficient to produce a belief that the thing is true 
or to justify the court in adopting the conclusion 
in support of which it is adduced. Walker v. 
Collins, 8 Cir. 59 F. 70, 8 C.C.A. 1; and to cause a 
reasonable person under all the circumstances to 
believe in its sufficiency; it is such an explana-
tion that the court is pre·suaded in its own mind 
thereby, that the possession is lawfully accounted 
for." (Italics added) 
In commenting on the effect of an explanation of 
stolen property found in the possession of a defendant 
the court further states : 
"Where defendant's explanation is not such 
as to meet these requirements, is not such as to 
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persuade the n1ind of the court to repose suffi-
cient confidence therein, to relieve the mind from 
doubt or nnrertainty and allay the question or 
doubt in the n1ind of the court, it is proper to sub-
Init the cause to the jury, to determine, not the 
satisfartoriness of defendant's explanation but the 
question of his guilt in the light of all the evidence 
i11clud iJ1!7 his e.rpla nat ion if he made any." (Italics 
added) 
It is respectfully submitted that defendant's explana-
tion of his possession of the stolen property is not one 
in which the Inind of the court could repose confidence. 
Indeed, the circumstances under which defendant was 
arrested and his conflicting explanations tend to prov:e 
his guilt. Officer Allen testified he received a call to go 
to the National Tavern and check "Slick" Thomas, "he 
was trying to sell some tools." (Tr. 21) At the time of 
his arrest defendant's testimony was evasive, and contra-
dictory of his later story. (Tr. 22) 
"OFFICER ALLEN: * * * when I pulled 
up with the police car, the defendant was standing 
in front of the National Tavern, right in front, I 
think, with three other fellows, by a meter post, 
and as I got out of the car I seen he had some-
thing in his hand, in his arn1, and he shoved it 
under his coat as I got out of the car. I walked 
over and asked what he had, and he stated he 
had a jug. I said, 'Let's see what you got, Virgf 
He said, 'I got a jug.' I opened his coat and these 
tools fell out. They were in a torn blue bedspread, 
a piece, that had the tools in this. I said, 'Virg, 
this don't look look much like a jug to me.' He 
didn't have much to say. I asked where he got 
them, and he said, 'I got them down to his place.' 
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I asked where his place was and he said, 'You 
know where my place is.' He finally told me, 'His 
mother's place.' I went and checked the story he 
got them at his hmne and found he hadn't got 
them there. * * * ." 
This is a piece of the same blue bedspread proved to be 
at the. scene of the crime. (Tr. 10, 11, 12) 
In court defendant came forward with a story that 
the tools were given him by a friend. On direct examina-
tion defendant testified as follows: (Tr. 33) 
"Q. In your own words I would like you to tell 
the jury how you came into possession of the 
tools 1 
A. Well, a friend of mine came over and handed 
them to me and as soon as he handed them to 
me I was arrested by Officer Allen. I didn't 
know what they were but he wanted sixty-five 
cents for the tools." 
The eye-witness testimony of Officer Jacobsen places the 
tools in defendant's exclusive possession before the. time 
defendant says they were handed to him by his friend. 
The Officer's testimony on direct examination reveals: 
(Tr. 50-51)· 
"Q. Alright, tell the court and jury the circum-
stances under which you saw the defendant. 
A. I just came out of the Eagle Clothing from 
purchasing a 'T' shirt. 
Q. Where is that in relation to the National 
Tavern~ 
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A. I would say three or four doors west, ap-
proximately. I was just going to get in my 
car, and I was advised by a person that Mr. 
Thomas,-
.. ~Ir. GL~-\S~L\.N: I object to that as hear-
say. 
··THE COURT: Objection sustained. 
"A. After I got in my car I noticed Mr. Thomas 
come out of the National Tavern, at this time 
he had a bulge under his coat, and as he 
reached the sidewalk, he was right about to 
the middle of the sidewalk he dropped a 
wrench, and the falling of this wrench, I 
noticed it, and he looked at me and made 
some remark, I don't just recall what it was, 
and due to the information told to me before 
that, I immediately went down to George's 
Cafe, where I called and asked if we had any 
tools missing, and I was informed by the desk 
sergeant that information could be received 
from Officers Allen and Mitchell the patrol 
car detail and I was advised to give them 
the information that I had. 
Q. What did you do~ 
A. I waited in front of the Cafe a short time and 
Mr. Allen came down and picked up Mr. 
Thomas. 
Q. Did you have occasion to observe Roy Allen, 
the man who just testified~ 
A. Yes sir, he was coming from the direction 
of the west, as I went to my car I noticed him 
coming. A person called to me and that is 
how I noticed him, he was a short distance 
between this fellow, Mr. Allen came up and 
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joined approximately four fellows, I wouldn't 
say the number, but Allen came up and talked 
to those men. 
Q. Did you observe the group conversing prior 
to the time Officer Allen arrived~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Did you observe any package given to the 
defendant1 
A. No sir, not while he was on the sidewalk or 
any other time." 
Officer Jacobson established the time elapsing be-
tween the first time he saw defendant and defendant's 
arrest to be seven to ten minutes "not over ten minutes." 
(Tr. ·54) At another point in the record defendant testi-
fied he was arrested within "two minutes" after he hand-
ed them (the tools) to me." (Tr. 34) 
Certainly, these inconsistencies in defendant's story 
and the contradictory circumstances do not supply a 
satisfactory explanation, nor are they consistent with 
innocence. 
This court, in State v. Kinsey, 77 Utah 348, 295 P. 
247, 249, said: 
"* * * Possession of articles recently stolen, 
when coupled with circumstances of hiding or con-
cealing them, or of disposing or attempting to 
dispose of them, or of making false or unreason-
able or unsatisfactory explanations of the posses-
sion may be sufficient to connect the possessor 
with. the commission of. the offense." 
10 
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The instant case presents. culpatory circumstances 
which were not present in the Kinsey case. Gransbury 
v. State, 64 Okla. Criin. Rep. 408, 81 P2d 874, 876, 877, 
supplies an interesting detail. There defendant was ar-
rested four miles frmn the scene of the burglary within 
a few hours after the crime had been committed. Not 
only possession of the burglarized wheat was proved, 
but a board which was shown to have been at the scene 
of the burglary was found on defendant's truck. The 
conviction of burglary in the second degree was sus-
tained. · 
The record in this case shows the stolen property in 
the possession of defendant, within a short distance from 
the scene of the burglary, within five hours from the time 
complaining witness parked his car, and before the bur-
glary came to his attention; further, defendant had in his 
possession, wrapped about the stolen tools, a piece of 
blue bedspread torn from that which complaining witness 
used as a seatcover. (Tr. 9, 10, 11, 12) 
That recent possession of burglarized property 
creates an inference of fact to be considered by the jury 
with all other circumstances, in determining the guilt or 
innocence of accused is supported by State v. Tucker, 
36 Ore. 291, 61 P. 894, 51 LRA 247. Payne v. State, 21 
Tex. App. 184, 17 S.W. 463, holds that recent pos·session 
of stolen property should be considered by the jury 
whether defendant gave any explanation or not. See fur-
ther State v. Royce, 38 Wash. 111, 80 P. 268. In People 
v. Taylor, 40 P. 2d 870,-4 Cal. App. 2d 214, it was held 
that the truth of defendant's explanation as to how he 
11 
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came into possession of the stolen property is a question 
for the jury. In addition, the court said, at page 871: 
"* * * Flight, false statements showing con-
sciousness of guilt, or as to how the property came 
into defendant's possession, assuming a false 
name, inability to find the person from whom de-
fendant claimed to have received the property, 
have each in turn been held to be sufficient to con-
nect the accused with the crime when proven in 
connection with possession of the stolen property. 
(Citing cases.)" 
This court has repeatedly adopted the position that 
unless there is no evidence to support the verdict the 
determination of the jury will not be disturbed on appeal. 
State v. Halford, 17 Utah 475, 54 P. 819; State v. Webb, 
18 Utah 441, 56 P. 159; State v. Endsley, 19 Utah 478, 
57 P. 430. See also People v. Willard, 150 Calif. 543, 89 
P. 124, 128, where the Court said: 
"* * * This court cannot disturb a verdict un-
less there is no evidence to support it, or where 
the evidence relied on by the prosecution is ap-
parently so improbable or false as to be incredible, 
or where it so clearly and unquestionably pre-
ponderates against the verdict as to convince this 
court that its return was the result of passion 
or prejudice on the part of the jury." 
The evidence adduced by the State connecting the 
defendant with the crime was direct, substantial, and 
clearly sufficient to warrant submission to the jury, and 
to authorize the jury to find as they did. 
Respondent respectfully submits that in view of the 
circumstances connecting defendant with the burglary, 
12 
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the failure of defendant to satisfactorily explain his pos-
session of the stolen property, and the neces'Sary reliance 
on the credibility of witnesses to determine defendant's 
guilt, the trial court properly refused to grant appellant's 
motion for a directed Yerdict. Indeed, a view of all the 
facts makes mandatory a conclusion they are not con-
sistent with the idea that defendant's possession was 
innocent; therefore defendant's guilt or innocence became 
a fact for the jury. 
It is further submitted that the evidence, both cir-
cumstantial and direct, to be found in the record, unques-
tionably supplies sufficient evidence upon which the 
verdict of guilty may rightfully rest. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Appellant states three grounds to support his motion 
for a new trial. They are: (1) insufficiency of the evi-
dence to warrant submission of the case to the jury; (2) 
insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict of 
guilty; (3) misconduct of the Assistant District Attorney. 
Appellant has chosen to argue the third ground only. 
We think alleged grounds one and two raise no issues 
not dealt with under Point I of respondent's brief, and 
respondent respectfully submits there is substantial evi-
dence in the record to establish the negative of these two 
propositions; therefore our argument here will be di-
rected to the third ground only. 
13 
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The particular act of the prosecuting attorney al-
leged as a grounds for a new trial in his purported threat 
to prosecute defendant's witness, Roy Allen, if he did 
not tell the truth. This, it is claimed intimidated the wit-
ness to the point of adversely influencing the manner in 
which the witness gave his testimony before the jury. 
This meeting between the prosecutor and Witness 
Allen took place outside the court room, away from the 
jury, and before ·the afternoon session of the court was 
· called to order. (Tr. 036-5, 6) There is no allegation that 
the testimony of this witness was any different after the 
meeting with the prosecutor than it would have been 
before, and the testimony he did give was substantially 
the same as that given by another of defendant's wit-
nesses, Francis W. Stoddard. (Tr. 26-30, 41-43) 
A like problem is dealt with in the case of Henwood 
v. People, 57 Colo. 544, 143 P. 373, 380, Ann. Cas. 1916A 
1111. There the District Attorney, in a published inter-
view said he was ''going to see to it" there was no per-
jured testimony. Appellant in a motion for a new trial 
alleged intimidation of the defense witnesses. The court, 
in passing on the issue, had this to say: 
"* * * we think it must affirmatively appear 
that defendant was prejudiced thereby, before 
such matters can be said to constitute error, and 
in the absence of such showing the claim made 
that he was is purely speculative. Moreover, it 
is apparent, that from the statement published, 
that it only referred to witnesses testifying false-
ly. Such a statement could not have frightened 
an honest witness * * *." 
14 
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To the same effect it' the case of State v. Williams, 
124 La. 779, 50 So. 711, where the District Attorney, be-
fore trial asserted he would have witnesses arrested for 
perjury if they did not tell the truth. The court refused 
to regard this as 1nisconduct substantially affecting the 
rights of the accused. 
We respectfully submit that unless it is made to 
appear that defendant has been prejudiced and deprived 
of a substantial right a new trial should not be granted 
where an examination of the entire record reveals that 
defendant had a fair and impartial trial, and his conv~c­
tion is supported in law and in fact. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that a review of 
the transcript and proceedings in this case discloses am-
ple and sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of 
appellant of the crime of third degree burglary. That 
the alleged misconduct of the prosecuting attorney was 
not such as to prejudice defendant's right to a fair and 
impartial trial. The conviction should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
RICHARD J. MAUGHAN, 
Assistant Attorney Gene.ral 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT. 
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